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Comparative Remarks on Liability for
One's Own Acts
FRANCO FERRARI*
I. SINGLE-RULE APPROACH AND PLURALISM
A. History
As all recognize, committing harm has lead to responsibility
from the earliest of times. ' But only Roman law succeeded in expres-
sing a comprehensive theory of civil liability.2 This liability, although
quite different from modem civil liability, 3 presents some characteris-
tics also found in modem legal systems. In fact, in Roman law, as in
some contemporary systems, liability is often cloaked in the guise of
special remedies.
4
In classical Roman law, only a finite number of well-defined
cases created tortious liability, i.e., were considered delicta.5 The
* Visiting Professor of Comparative Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, San
Francisco; Dr. lur. (Bologna); LL.M. (Augsburg). The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Ms. Jessica Rudin, who revised the style of his text. This Article is dedicated to
Professor Francesco Galgano, Bologna University.
1. FERDINAND F. STONE, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT DOCTRINE 1
(1977) ("[even t]he Codes of Hammurabi and Moses are replete with provisions for retribu-
tion, compensation or vengeance.")
2. R.W. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN DUTCH LAW 268 (1915).
The Roman law of delict, derived from the [Twelve] Tables and from a still more
primitive customary law, came in time.., to express a very complete theory of civil
liability. A few simple principles covered the whole ground, and, adopted in modem
codes, have been found sufficient to provide for the complexities of modem life.
Id.
3. The Roman law of torts, at least at the very beginning, characterized delict as a penal
action. Thus, in principle, the action died with the wrongdoer. STONE, supra note 1, at 4.
Only "in process of time the distinction between public and private offenses became more and
more developed, until ultimately a separation between crimina publica and delicta privata was
fully recognized." PATRICK MAC COMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN
CIVIL LAW 198 (1988).
4. See Jean Limpens et al., Liability for One's Own Act, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 5 (AndrE Tunc ed., 1979) (noting that "the concept of
liability has always made its first appearance in the guise of special remedies appropriate to
particular circumstances").
5. Delicta, not unlike contracts, have always been considered sources of obligation in
Roman law, while other sources arose later. See, e.g., FRANCO FERRARI, ATIPICITA
DELL'ILLECITO CIVILE 43 (1992). In fact, Gaius listed only the two aforementioned sources
of obligations in his Institutiones. See generally WITOLD WOLODKIEWICZ, OBLIGATIONES EX
VARIIS CAUSARUM FIGURIS (1968). At a later date, Gaius mentioned three sources. Id. In
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most important of these were furtum,6 rapina, iniuria7 and those
stemming from the lex Aquilia. The furtum initially covered only
theft, but later, it was extended to become a comprehensive tort to
property.8 The rapina 9 was defined as a robbery conducted with vio-
lence,' 0 while the iniuria covered personal injury. As for the lex
Aquilia :11 "[tlhe harm had originally to be caused by a positive act
which damaged the property by direct corporeal means,"12 i.e., the
harm had to be corpore corpori datum.' 3
This pragmatic case-by-case approach continued to dominate the
law of liability into the Middle Ages.' 4 After this time, the scope of
the lex Aquilia expanded to cover even those cases where harm to
persons or property resulted only indirectly from actions by an-
other. 15 Roman law, however, never endorsed the general principle
that one is responsible for all the harm he causes.1 6 Scholars first ar-
rived at this general principle in the seventeenth century.' 7 It is upon
this principle that the first civil codes based their rules.18
the post-classical period, the number of sources of obligation increased further. First, there
were four sources; then later, in the post-classical period, a fifth one, the lex, was added. See 4
E. PACCIFICI-MAZZONI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO 147 (1908). Some authors,
however, insist the fifth source was added in the Middle Ages. See, e.g., RAYMOND MONIER,
MANUEL LtIMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 34 (1970).
6. See A. CARELLI, LA REPRESSIONE DEL FURTO FLAGRANTE (1939); H.F. JOLOWICZ,
D. 47.2, DE FURTIS (1940); F. de Visscher, Lefur manifestus, Nouv. REV. HIST. 442 (1929).
7. See generally 2 EMILIO BETrI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO ROMANO 519 (1960); WIL-
LIAM W. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 326-28 (1981); ERWIN SEIDL,
ROMISCHES PRIVATRECHT 208 (1963).
8. 2 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 291
(Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987).
9. See generally HANS HATTENHAUER, GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES BORGERLICHEN
RECHTS 97 (1982); FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 581-85 (1951).
10. Rapina became a separate action only in 76 B.C., ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW &
COMPARATIVE LAW 70 (1991).
11. For general discussion of the lex Aquilia, see BERNARDO ALBANESE, STUDI SULLA
LEGGE AQUILIA (1950); David Daube, On the Third Chapter of the Lex Aquilia, 52 LAW Q.
REV. 253 (1936); E. Debray, Lefermier et la loi Aquilia, NOUV. REV. HIST. 643 (1933); J.M.
Kelly, The Meaning of the Lex Aquilia, 80 LAW Q. REV. 73 (1964); ANDREAS VON THUR,
ZUR SCHATZUNG DES SCHADENS BEI DER LEX AQUILIA (1892).
12. 2 ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 8, at 292.
13. See BETTI, supra note 7, at 510; FERRARI, supra note 5, at 53.
14. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5.
15. See, e.g., 2 ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 8, at 292.
16. Id.
17. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5. Samuel Pufendorf first recognized this princi-
ple. See 3 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE IURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 1 (1672).
18. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5-6.
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B. The French General Rule
When the French Code Civil was drafted in 1804, the principle of
general tortious liability was already firmly established in France. 19
Article 1382 codified this principle, stating that "every act by which a
person causes damage to another makes the person by whose fault the
damage occurred liable to make reparation .... -20 This rule, which
applied where the damage had been caused either intentionally or
negligently, 21 governed the French legal system even before its codifi-
cation,22 but did not in the beginning apply to all types of cases.
Even at that time, the rule encompassed many different kinds of
damages, "[flrom homicide to a superficial wound, from burning
down a great building to smashing up a paltry shack .... -23 Never-
theless, this provision did not govern all types of damage. In fact, in
the beginning, only the harm caused to droits subjectifs (i.e., to rights
such as life, property, or honor)24 rendered the person who caused the
damage civilly liable.25
It was only twenty years ago that the French rule developed into
a clause gindral,26 encompassing all kinds of damages. In fact, until
1970, one could claim damages only if a "legally protected interest of
the plaintiff"2 7 had been violated.28 After a learned decision of the
Cour de Cassation on February 27, 1970,29 even the violation of a pure
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. (quoting CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1382 (Fr.)).
21. See C. civ. art. 1383 (Fr.) ("[E]veryone is responsible for the damage of which he is
the cause, not only by his own act, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence.").
22. See PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNtS, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLI-
GATIONs 21 (1985).
23. 13 A. LOCRt, LGISLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE
58 (1836-1838).
24. For the prerequisite for the violation of a droit, see 1 GuDO ALPA & MARIO BES-
SONE, ATIPICITA DELL'ILLECITO 283 (1981); FERRARI, supra note 5, at 63.
25. See also BORIS STARCK, DROIT CIVIL 52 (3d ed. 1985).
26. The French single rule has been defined as a general clause. E.g., 1 ALPA & BES-
SONE, supra note 24, at 247.
27. STONE, supra note 1, at 23.
28. The French speak of an intdrt ldgitime juridiquement protdgd. See, e.g., Henri
Mazeaud, La ldsion d'un intdrt juridiquement protog, condition de la responsibilitd civile, D.
39 (1954).
29. See, e.g., Giuseppe Branca, Morte di chi convive more uxorio e risarcimento, FORO IT.
142 (1970); Combaldieu, La rdparation du dommage subi par la concubine d la suite de
raccident dont le concubin a dtd victime, FORO IT. 141 (1970); Vidal, L'arr~t de la chambre
mixte du 27fdvrier 1970, le droit d /a rdparation de la concubine et le concept de dommage
rdparable, J.C.P. 2390 (1971).
1993] 815
816 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 15:813
interest could give rise to a claim for damages. 30 In the aforemen-
tioned case, the court stated that even a concubine might claim com-
pensation for grief caused by the killing of her partner. 31
The French legal system is not the only one based upon a general
clause. Quite the contrary, nearly all legal systems of the "romanistic
legal family,"' 32 whose private law has been largely influenced by the
French Code Civil, 33 are governed by a general clause or a single rule
of general civil liability. 34 These countries include: Argentina,
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Panama,
Puerto Rico, Spain, Quebec, Venezuela, the formerly Socialist coun-
tries, the Scandinavian 35 countries, as well as the state of Louisiana. 36
This does not mean, however, that all these legal systems impose civil
liability as broadly as the French system does. While some legal sys-
tems, such as those of Mexico 37 and Rumania, 38 do so others, such as
30. See, e.g., 1 ALPA & BESSONE, supra note 24, at 297.
31. 2 ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 8, at 312.
32. For the use of the expression "romanistic legal family," see, e.g., 5 Heymann,
Romanische Rechtsordnungen, in HANDW6RTERBUCH DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 151
(Schlegelberger ed., 1928).
33. For a discussion of the reception of the Code civil, see generally Sir Maurice Amos,
The Code Napoldon and the Modern World, 10 J. COMP. LEGIs. 222 (1928); Jean Limpens,
Territorial Expansion of the Code, in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD
92 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1956); Imre Zajtay, Les Destin6es du Code civil, 6 REVUE INTERNA-
TIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt [R.I.D.C.] 792 (1954).
34. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5. Some argue that "no legal systems of the French
type abandon the principle of general civil liability." Id. at 6. For a more complete list of
European countries governed by a single rule, see Franco Ferrari, Tipicitd e atipicitd delfatto
illecito. I. I contrapposti modelli francese e tedesco, in ATLANTE DI DIRITTO PRIVATO COM-
PARATO 136 (Francesco Galgano & Franco Ferrari eds., 1992). For a list concerning the
American continent, see Paolo Gallo, Tipicitd e atipicitd dell'illecito in common law, in
ATLANTE DI DIRITrO PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra, at 147. For another list, see Limpens et
al., supra note 4, at 5-6.
35. See, e.g., Jan Hellner, Diviloppements et rdle de la ResponsibilitJ Civile Ddlictuelle
dans les Pays Scandinaves, 11 R.I.D.C. 779 (1967).
36. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5-6.
37. For the Mexican rule relating to non-marital cohabitation, see C6DIGO CIVIL PARA
EL DISTRITO FEDERAL art. 1635 (1). See also Giutron Fuentevilla, Mixique, in DES CONCU-
BINAGES DANS LE MONDE 117 (J. Rubellin-Devichi ed., 1990) (commenting on this provision);
KARL AUGUST PRINZ VON SACHSEN GESSAPHE, DAS KONKUBINAT IN DEN MEXIKANIS-
CHEN ZIVILRECHTSORDNUNGEN (1990).
38. The Rumanian legal system also permits a partner to pursue a claim for damages
against a tortfeasor where its partner has been wrongfully killed. This civil action was judi-
cially created by the Rumanian Supreme Court. See, e.g., Judgment of November 13, 1959,
n. 1241, published in CULGERE 183 (1959). Some critics, however, oppose this broadening of
basis for civil liability. See ANGHEL ET AL., RASPUNDEREA CIVILA 261 (1970). Nevertheless,
the court continues the trend. For a more recent decision by the Supreme Court supporting
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that of Italy,3 9 are not as broad. This explains why the Italian system
does not yet allow a concubine to recover damages when its cohabi-
tant party has been wrongfully killed.40
C. Pluralism and the Law of Torts
Although many legal systems have adopted the single-rule ap-
proach, even today, the principle of general civil liability is not univer-
sally accepted. 41 Indeed, some legal systems refused to give official
sanction to the aforementioned single-rule, even where it was already
implanted in tradition. For example, in Germany, the legislature pre-
ferred a solution that avoided "taking the crucial step to the great
general clause,"'42 even though some regions, such as Prussia43 or Ba-
den," had already adopted one. The German legislature's alternate
solution avoided giving judges unfettered power to define and discover
particular torts, as such action was inconsistent with its conception of
the judicial function.4s Thus, "German law, unlike French law and
the aforementioned right of a surviving partner recovering damages, see Judgment of Decem-
ber 15, 1978, REVISTA ROMANA DE DREPT 51 (1979).
39. For discussion of the scope of the Italian general clause, see generally LA RESPON-
SABILITA CIVILE, UNA RASSEGNA DI DOT'RINA E GIURISPRUDENZA (Guido Alpa & Mario
Bessone eds., 1987); MASSIMO FRANZONI, I FATrI ILLECITI. ART. 2043-59 (1993); Francesco
Galgano, Le mobilifrontiere del danno ingiusto, CONTRATrO E IMPRESA 1 (1985); GIOVANNA
VISINTINI, I FATri ILLECITI (1987).
40. Even though the Italian Supreme Court disallows the possibility of claiming damages
in wrongful death cases of a cohabiting partner, some lower courts permit it. See, e.g., the
decisions of the court of Verona on December 3, 1980, published in REsP. CIv. PREV. 74
(1981); the decision of the Pretura di Genova on May 21, 1981, FORO IT. 1460 (1982).
Furthermore, at the beginning of the century, the Italian Supreme Court itself considered
the possibility of allowing a claim for damages for the wrongful death of a partner. See, e.g.,
its decision on May 19, 1911, FORO IT. 798 (1911).
A recently drafted compulsory car insurance law includes a provision for the surviving
partner to claim damages in case of a cohabiting partner's wrongful death. This draft has not
yet been enacted. The author criticized it and suggested a new proposal in Franco Ferrari, La
tutela aquiliana della convivenza more uxorio, CORRIERE GIURIDICO 931 (1992).
41. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5.
42. 2 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 8, at 293.
43. Id. (citing the Prussian General Land Law that provides that "a person who injures
another intentionally or by gross negligence must pay full compensation to that other").
44. When the German legislature drafted its civil code, both Baden and the area west of
the Rhine followed the French Code Civil. Id. For discussion of the influence and reception of
the French Code Civil in Germany, see generally Gustav von Boehmer, Der Einfluf3 des Code
civil aufdie Rechtsentwicklung in Deutschland, 151 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
289 (1950); 151 Karl H. Neumayer, Deutsche undfranzdsische Zivilrechtswissenschaft - Besinn-
liches zu einem Nachbarschafts und Partnerschaftsverhaltnis unter Verwandten, in 1 lus
PRIVATUM GENTIUM 165 (1969).
45. 2 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 8, at 294. Nevertheless, at the time of the German
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many other legal systems, has supplemented [its three] general clauses
by a small number of 'special' delicts." 6
This does not mean that the common law and the German law
approach are equivalent. While common law torts are diversified and
numerous, the German law lays down three main rules concerning
general civil liability.4 7 The first rule attaches civil liability to the vio-
lation of certain rights, the so-called Rechtsguter, or absolute rights,4 8
such as physical integrity, freedom, and property. The second rule
covers violations of so-called Schutznormen, provisions designed to
protect individuals' interests.4 9 The third imposes civil liability for
damages caused by improper conduct.50 These rules, however, do not
yet allow a victim to recover for all types of damages. For example, in
Civil code's enactment some scholars favored the "great" general clause. See, e.g., H. LIszT,
DELIKTSOBLIGATIONEN 25 (1898).
46. 1 E.J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 154 (2d ed. 1968).
47. These statutes include cases involving action which endangers a third person's credit
(BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 824), induces a woman to engage in illicit intercourse
(BGB § 825) and breaches a civil servant's official duty (BGB § 839). 1 COHN, supra note 46,
at 159.
48. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 10. BGB § 823 (1) states that "[a] person who, inten-
tionally or negligently, injures unlawfully the life, body, health, freedom, property or any other
right of another is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom." 1 COHN,
supra note 46, at 155.
Traditionally, this provision has been interpreted to require a violation of an absolute
right in order to receive compensation for damages. See W. KALLWASS, PRIVATRECHT 128
(1990); KUPISCH & KROGER, DELIKTSRECHT 20 (1987); DIETER MEDICUS, GESETZLICHE
SCHULDVERHALTNISSE 46 (1985). However, the phrase "any other rights of another" does
not necessarily require this interpretation. See Fritz Fabricius, Zur Dogmatik des "sonstigen
Rechts" gemd;6 § 823 Abs. 1 BGB, 160 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 273 (1961);
Wolfgang Mincke, Forderungsrechte als "sonstige Rechte" im Sinne des § 823 Ab& 1 BGB,
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 862 (1984). Recently, some commentators have raised doubts about
this traditional interpretation, viewing the statute as a potential general clause. See, e.g., FER-
RARI, supra note 5, at 178, 183, 189, 193. See also 1 COHN, supra note 46, at 155 (referring to
BGB § 823(1) as one of Germany's three general clauses).
49. BGB § 823(2): "A person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the protec-
tion of others incurs the same obligation. If, according to the purview of the statute, infringe-
ment is possible even without any fault on the part of the wrongdoer, the duty to make
compensation arises only if some fault can be imputed to him." For discussion of
Schutzgesetze, see generally BISTRIZKI, VORAUSSETZUNGEN FOR DIE QUALIFIKATION EINER
NORM ALS SCHUTZGESETZ IM SINNE DES § 823 ABS. 2 (1981); Heinrich D6rner, Zur Dogma-
tik der Schutzgesetzverletzung - BGH, NJW 1982, 1037 und NJW 1985, 134, 27 JURISTISCHE
SCHULUNG [JuS] 522 (1987); Ernst A. Kramer, Schutzgesetze und adaquate Kausalitat, 31 JZ
338 (1976).
50. BGB § 826 establishes the rule that "[a] person who intentionally causes damage to
another in a manner contra bonos mores is bound to compensate the other for this damage." 1
COHN, supra, note 46, at 158. See also H. Coing, Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsdtze in der Recht-
sprechung des Reichsgerichts zum Begriffder "guten Sitten" (BGB §§ 138, 826), 1 NEUE JURI-
STISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 213 (1947); REINHARD GRUNWALD, SITTENWDRIGKEIT,
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Germany, the surviving partner of a wrongfully killed person cannot
claim damages. 5' Thus, German law leaves considerable gaps that
judges must fill by using powers similar to what the legislature of 1900
did not want to grant them.
52
Although other legal systems belonging to the Germanistic legal
family follow the French single-rule system, 53 the German legal sys-
tem does not. Germany is not the only system to reject the single-rule
approach. Indeed, it is widely recognized that the law of tort is ex-
tremely diversified in the common law countries, 54 even more so than
the German system with its three basic rules concerning civil liabil-
ity.55 Thus, some commentators characterize common law as a sys-
RECHTSWIDRIGKEIT UND DOLUS MALUS (1974); Manfred von Wolf, Der Ersatzberechtigte bei
Tatbestanden sittenwidriger Schddigung, 20 NJW 709 (1967).
51. German scholars unanimously reject the possibility of allowing recovery of such dam-
ages. See, e.g., Claus Becker, Schadenersatz wegen verletzungsbedingter Beeintrachtigung der
Haushaltsf,'hrung auch fir Unverheiratete, 31 MONATSSCHRIFr FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 705
(1977); H.J. Becker, Die nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaft im Schadensrecht, VERSICHERUNG-
SRECHT 201 (1985); Dunz, Freie Lebensgemeinschaft der Unfallwitwe, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT
509 (1985); Uwe Jagert, Deliktsrechtliche Betrachtungen zur nichtehelichen Lebensgemein-
schaft aus der Sicht des deutschen und italienischen Rechts, 53 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr
[RABELSZ] 718 (1989).
52. Gaps in the German statutory law of torts include lack of protection for privacy
rights. See 1 COHN, supra note 46, at 65. Judges consequently fill in these gaps. Hence, courts
follow academic doctrine and accept the view that "there exists a general legal right to the free
and undisturbed development of the personality of every individual being." Id. Courts now
recognize this as one of the absolute rights protected by BGB § 823(1). Id. at 1550. Similarly,
"[w]ithin very narrow limits the existence of an absolute right in the continued existence of an
established business has been recognized." Id.
53. Although most other countries belonging to the Germanic legal family employ a ter-
minology similar to that used by the German Civil Code, these countries "have nevertheless
introduced texts in more general terms." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 9.
For example, Austrian law states that
every person has the right to exact compensation from the wrongdoer for damage he
has caused through his fault; the damage may be caused through breach of contrac-
tual duty or may be unrelated to any contract.
Similarly anyone who intentionally causes harm by improper conduct is liable
for it, although if it is caused in the exercise of a right, he is only so liable if the
exercise of the right obviously had the open purpose of causing damage to another.
Id. at 10 n.51 (quoting Austrian Civil Code § 1295 [hereinafter ABGB]).
Switzerland also embraces "the French concept of a general principle of liability."
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 10. See also FERRARI, supra note 5, at 12. " 'Anyone who
causes damage to another in an unlawful manner, whether intentionally or negligently or care-
lessly, is bound to make it good.'" Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 9-10 n.47 (quoting Swiss C.
Obligations art. 41(1)).
For further examples, see id. at 9-10.
54. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 10.
55. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Sir John Salmond soundly rejected the
possibility of any single principle underlying the various specific torts. "Just as criminal law
consists of a body of rules establishing specific offences [sic], so the law of torts consists of a
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
tem based upon an "unrestricted pluralism,"5 6 comprised of a
virtually limitless number of different torts, such as battery, assault,
nuisance, trespass to land, and trespass to chattel.
Despite this pluralism, both scholars5 7 and judges58 attempt to
unify these torts under general liability principles. For instance,
judges first introduced the tort of negligence, which is replacing grad-
ually the different triditional unintentional torts59 in both British 6°
and United States law.
61
II. THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF TORTIouS LIABILITY
A. Act and Omission
The definitions of tort,62 unerlaubte Handlung, ddlit, and fatto
illecito, seem to differ greatly from one another in different legal sys-
tems. Nonetheless, there are certain requirements in all legal systems
without which no right to claim damages exists. Without (1) an in-
tentional or negligent act (or omission) which (2) causes (3) damages,
no tortious liability results, i.e., no obligation to compensate for dam-
ages arises.
63
The very first prerequisite of tortious liability is an objective ele-
ment, 64 conduct. However, while all agree that an act can give rise to
body of rules establishing specific injuries. Neither in the one case nor in the other is there any
general principle of liability." 2 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 8, at 300 (quoting SIR JOHN
SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1910)).
56. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 5, 10.
57. See id. at 11.
58. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
59. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 11.
60. See Gallo, supra note 34, at 154.
61. See, e.g., JAMES HENDERSON & RICHARD PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 268
(1975) (stating that "[n]egligence is today, and has been for many years, the most important
basis of tort liability in the United States").
62. Doubts exist concerning the possibility of defining "tort." See, e.g., W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 1 (5th ed. 1984). "Even
though tort law is now recognized as a proper subject, a really satisfactory definition of a tort is
yet to be found." Id. (footnote omitted). In fact, "no such definition of a tort can be offered.
A tort, in English law, can only be defined in terms which really tell us nothing." 2 MILES,
DIGEST OF ENGLISH LAW XIV (1910).
63. See, e.g., 2(2) FRANCESCO GALGANO, DIRITTO CIVILE E COMERCIALE 282-83
(1990) (noting that these elements are required in Italy); MALAURIE & AYNItS, supra note 22,
at 35 (required in France); FERRARI, supra note 5, at 160 (these elements, along with unlawful-
ness, are required in Germany).
64. 4 JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 93 (1969) (speaking of an act (or omission) of
man as a material element).
820 [Vol. 15:813
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liability,65 in the past, some doubted whether an omission could be
compared to an act and, therefore, result in civil liability. In nine-
teenth century France, for example, this was not at all possible.66 To-
day, no doubt exists about the possibility of comparing these forms of
conduct to each other.67 Even though this is generally recognized in
most legal systems, for example in the United States,6 France, 69 It-
aly70 and Germany, 7I differences still exist. Hence, "as for the civil
liability, the rule relating to the nonfeasance is opposite to the one
relating to misfeasance. The latter is generally tortious .... The prej-
udicial nonfeasance, on the contrary, is permitted, except in the case
where one is committed to help another person, ' ' 72 or, in more general
terms, where one has the duty to act in order to avoid damages. 73
65. This principle has never been doubted, even in less recent periods; in fact, it has even
been argued that "in the early common law one who injured another by a positive, affirmative
act, was held liable without any great regard even for his fault." KEETON ET AL., supra note
62, § 56, at 373.
66. See MALAURIE & AYNS, supra note 22, at 36 (stating that the individualistic case-
law of the nineteenth century denied that possibility; "a sole negative fact could not constitute
a fault"). Even in those times, however, some voices favored allowing omissions to give rise to
civil liability. See, e.g., Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 36, quoting LOYSEL, INSTITUTIONS
COUTUMIfRES (2d ed. 1783) ("He sins who can prevent and fails.").
67. See, e.g., ANDRif TUNC, Introduction, in 11 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES, supra note 4, at 38, where the authors proclaim that "nowadays, however, there is a
noticeable move in favor of making the standard of reasonable man, exercising normal care
and prudence, the test to apply in every case - cases of mere omission included. The distinction
(between act and omission) thus appears to become redundant and ought to be abandoned."
Id.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6 (comparing an omission to an act).
69. See, e.g., a very famous decision, the arrit Branly on February 27, 1951, published in
D., 1951, 329; see also the decision of the French Cassation civile of January 17, 1978, pub-
lished in JURIS CLASSEUR PtRIODIQUE, 1978, IV, 95.
70. Italian judges often point out the comparison between act and omission. See, e.g., the
following decisions of the Italian Cassazione civile: December 12, 1988, n. 6739; February 24,
1987, n. 1943; March 18, 1982, n. 1785.
71. FERRARI, supra note 5, at 125.
72. 1 RENt SAVATIER, TRAITIt DE LA RESPONSABILITf- CIVILE EN DROIT FRANgAIS
CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIF, PROFESSIONNEL, PROCtDURAL 56 (2d ed. 1951).
73. See Andri Tunc, Introduction, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 38.
In Italy, tortious nonfeasance results from a violation of such duty to act "which can
result from law, from a contract or from a previous conduct." PIETRO TRIMARCHI, ISTITU-
ZIONI DI DiRrrTo PRIVATO 137 (1986).
This remains true as well in the German legal systems. I COHN, supra note 46, at 56. See
also HANS BROX, BESONDERES SCHULDRECHT 333 (1987) (noting that the duty to act can
result from contract and "from a factual position into which the defendant has brought him-
self"). Furthermore, "[t]he German courts have established the principle that everybody who
enters into relations with the public must pay due regard to the position of members of the
public." I COHN, supra note 46, at 156. One must compensate the injured party for damages
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B. Intent
Conduct is also closely linked to another condition of liability,
the existence of intentional or at least negligent behavior,74 i.e.,
fault. 7 5
In the French legal system, the existing link between conduct
resulting from the failure to do this, or from the failure to comply with the so-called Verkehrs-
sicherungspflicht, i.e., the duty to take all precautions to avoid dangers and damages which
could arise from entering into relations with third parties. For discussion of the Verkehrs-
sicherungspflichten, see generally A. VON BAR, VERKEHRSSICHERUNGSPFLICHTEN (1980);
Christian von Bar, Entwicklungen und Entwicklungstendenzen im Recht der Verkehrs-
(sicherungs)pflichten, 28 Jus 169 (1988); H. Mertens, Verkehrspflichten und Deliktsrecht, VER-
SICHERUNGSRECHT 307 (1980); HANS STOLL, ZUM RECHTSFERTIGUNGSGRUND DES
VERKEHRS-RICHTIGEN VERHALTENS 137 (1958).
In the French system, one must note that, while in earlier times one who failed to bring
help to a person in danger was morally reprehensible, but not legally liable, "the new article 63
of the French Penal Code punishes a person who voluntarily abstains from bringing help to a
person in peril when he may do so without risk to himself or to others." F.H. LAWSON ET
AL., AMOS & WALTON'S INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 218 (3d ed. 1967) (citation omit-
ted) [hereinafter AMOS & WALTON]. Belgium has introduced a similar statute as well.
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 37-38.
74. Although generally both intentional and negligent conduct are equivalent, i.e., both
types of conduct can give rise to possible damage claims in all legal systems, some specific
situations require the intention to perform a harmful act in order to be considered a tort and to
oblige the wrongdoer to compensate for the damages caused. In Germany, for instance, while
the violation of certain Rechsguter and the culpable breach of a Schutzgesetz can constitute a
tort if caused either intentionally or negligently, certain damage caused by improper conduct
need only be compensated if caused intentionally. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 26.
Furthermore, while one may contract to exempt oneself from responsibility for unintentional
harms, "a party may not exempt himself from future liability for intentional harms." BGB
§ 276(2). But see 2 O.C. GILES ET AL., MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 45 (E.J. Cohn ed., 2d ed.
1971) (noting that HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] § 458(2) prevents the exclusion of liability
for negligence for damage caused by the Federal Railways).
In Italy as well, some harmful behaviors give rise to an obligation to compensate for
damages only if intent exists. One such tort, called illeciti di dolo, is inducement of a third
person to breach a contract. See, e.g., P. Marino, La responsabilitd da induzione
all'inadempimento, Riv. CRIT. DIR. PRIV. 849 (1987) (discussing this tort); C. Verde, Note in
tema di responsabilitd del terzo per induzione all'inadempimento, RAsS. DIR. civ. 421 (1985)
(discussing this tort); F. ZICCARDI, L'INDUZIONE ALL'INADEMPIMENTO (1979) (discussing
this tort). See generally PAOLO CENDON, IL DOLo NELLA RESPONSABILITA EXTRACON-
TRATTUALE (1974).
Some torts in Roman law required intent, or malus animus, such as thefurtum, "other-
wise it (theft) would attach in cases where the party was entirely innocent of any offense; as,
for instance, in cases of error or bonafides." MAC COMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 3,
at 207.
75. This requirement for civil liability made its entrance into French law during the Mid-
dle Ages, when it "accorded well with the moral notions of the time. Liability without fault
would be a social injustice: it would be 'the equivalent in civil law to the condemnation of an
innocent person in criminal law.'" AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 203 (footnote
omitted).
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and intent or negligence results from the concept offaute.76 Faute7 7
is one of the French conditions for liability.78 It is composed of the
objective element of conduct and a subjective element 79 of either in-
tent or negligence8 0 Thus, conduct gives rise to possible damages
claims only if the offender is blameworthy, i.e., if he acted intention-
ally or at least negligently.
Intent has replaced the earlier requirement of unlawfulness.8' Its
76. In spite of the importance of the concept of faute in French and Louisiana laws,
neither the French nor the Louisiana legislature provides any definition offaute. STONE, supra
note 1, at 84. Even though this may seem inappropriate, it is not, because
when one looks further, one can see that it is important that fault be not defined in
the terms of any one age. It has been well said that 'fault is the mirror of our times:
what we ... decide fault to be, that is fault. As such, fault is a fluid term definable
only with respect to its surrounding and thus, with the concept of fault, we can
incorporate into our tort law a new situation without changing our definition of fault:
fault remains the same; it is we, members of society who change.'
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. Many definitions have been given offaute. Planiol, for example, has defined it as "a
violation of an preexisting obligation," Planiol, Du fondement de la responsabiliti, REV. CR.
LEG. ET JUR. 80 (1905), and as "failure to do one's duty." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 64.
Starck, by contrast, defined faute as "the d6faillance of man who does not fulfill his tasks."
STARCK, supra note 25, at 31. De Cupis provided a similar definition to the one proposed in
the text. 1 ADRIANO DE CUPIS, IL DANNO 116 (2d ed. 1966) (describingfaute as a "state of
mind which, with reference to a particular kind of damage, can be considered blameworthy").
78. "[T]he requirement offaute did not appear in all the projets of the Code Civil, e.g.
Cambac~res' second projet declared: celui qui cause un dommage (he who causes a damage is
bound to repair it) which had it been adopted would have established a responsibility based on
cause alone." STONE, supra note 1, at 81 n.40 (citation omitted).
79. Some authors speak offaute as the conjunction of three elements:
(1) a material element, an act of man as is referred to in Code Napol6on article 1382
and Louisiana Civil Code article 2315; (2) a psychological element: "la volonte" that
could change the course of things; and (3) a sociological element: the reprobation
directed by society with regard to the defendant's conduct which gives it character
reprehensible and blameworthy ....
STONE, supra note 1, at 85 (citation omitted).
80. For classical jurists studying Roman law, the necessary presence of either dolus or
culpa, i.e., blame or fault, was implied by the word iniuria, which "probably meant at first
merely the absence of some lawful excuse for the act causing death or damage." 1 F.H. LAW-
SON & B.S. MARKESINIS, TORTIous LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COM-
MON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 22 (1982).
81. For a discussion on the relationship between unlawfulness and intentional harm in
Louisiana law, see STONE, supra note 1, at 85-89:
Whereas under the notion of unlawfulness the will of the ruler expressed in proscrip-
tions became the measure of liability, under this touchstone the will of the individual
expressed in his action causing damages becomes a subject source of liability. Society
was now sufficiently developed to take a lap from the safe haven of formal proscrip-
tions (unlawfulness) to a less predicate territory in which man's intention became the
key to liability.
Id. at 85-86.
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definition poses no substantial problems in civil law countries.8 2 In-
tent,8 3 or as the French call it, faute intentionelle,8 4 occurs "when
there is the intention to provoke a harmful event."'1 5  In some civil
cases, however, "intention to cause the damage is not required.
'8 6
For certain German statutes, "the acts in question are held to be in-
tentional if the interference with the absolutely protected legal prop-
erty (Rechtsgut) or the breach of public duty was intentional.
'87
Although no uniform definition of intent exists at common law,88
one well accepted definition states that "[t]he word 'intent' is used to
... denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or
that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to re-
sult from it."' 9 This definition is not very different from that which
governs the civil law, even though the scope of the latter seems to be
broader since it covers even those cases where "the actor knew that
his act might involve harmful consequences for others .... -9 Civil
law systems also recognize intentional fault, dolus eventualis, when
there is "the conscience of the probability of the damage and its ac-
82. See, e.g., Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 30 ("The meaning of fault in intentional
conduct (faute intentionelle) has not been the subject of any important discussion" in France.).
83. For an Italian definition of intent, see, e.g., TRIMARCHI, supra note 73, at 142 ("[T]he
intent consists in the awareness and willingness to cause the harmful event."). In Germany,
intent as it relates to the law of torts has been defined as Wissen und Wollen der Tat, i.e., the
awareness and willingness of the act.
84. See generally Bri6re de l'Isle, Lafaute dolosive, D. 1980, 180; R. Jambu-Merlin, Dol
et faute lourde, D. 1955, 89; Genevi6ve Viney, Remarques sur la distinction entre la faute
intentionelle, faute inexcusable et la faute lourde, D. 1975, 263.
85. Cass. civ., 12 June 1974, D. 1975, 173. For similar definitions in both German and
Italian laws, see HANS BROX, ALLGEMEINES SCHULDRECHT 127-33 (15th ed. 1987); FER-
RARI, supra note 5, at 69; Carlos A. Funaioli, Dolo, in 13 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRIrO 738
(1964); GALGANO, supra note 63, at 303; KUPISCH & KROGER, supra note 48, at 72.
86. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 30.
87. Id.
88. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 8, at 33, state that even though "in a loose and
general sense, the meaning of 'intent' is easy to grasp. . . 'intent' is also one of the most often
misunderstood legal concepts."
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). This is not, however, the only
definition of intent known in American law. In fact, the American Institute of Law itself
defines the intent differently in the Model Penal Code. For a similar definition made prior to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORTS 23 (W.V.H. Rog-
ers ed., 1975) [hereinafter WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ] (stating that intention "signifies full ad-
vertence in the mind of the defendant to his conduct, which is in question, and to its
consequences, together with a desire for those consequences").
90. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 31-32. For a similar definition of intent, see the
German Democratic Republic's Civil Code § 333(2) [ZGB], which states that "the citizen who
causes the damage deliberately or deliberately tolerates that the damage can occur as a result
of his behavior, acts intentionally."
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ceptance without any justifiable reason. In this case, the faute con-
sists in the acceptance of the risk to third parties rather than in a
damage intentionally caused." 9' Consequently, there is dolus eventu-
alis92 when "the person imagines the possible harmful event, and ac-
cepts it in case of its realization.
9 3
C. Negligence
As mentioned previously, no fault liability94 attaches unless harm
has been caused by conduct which is at least negligent, 95 i.e, unless
damages have been caused by "a person who does not exercise ordi-
nary care."' 96 Most civil law countries97 accept this definition of negli-
91. M.L. RASSAT, RESPONSABILITtI CIVILE 29 (1983).
92. The existence of the dolus eventualis in civil law systems should make it possible to
compare the civil law and the common law concepts of intention. There are, however, differ-
ent theories concerning the degree of intention required for fault.
The first is the theory generally accepted in France that fault in intentional behavior
presupposes an intention to harm (dolus). The same approach is followed in German
CC § 226 and 826 ....
According to the second theory, which is current in Germany, in the Socialist
countries and in the countries of the Common Law, there is fault in intentional be-
havior when the actor knew that his act might involve harmful consequences for
others' dolus eventualis.
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 31-32. The authors, by making this distinction, seem not to
consider the existence of the so-called faute inexcusable, the French equivalent of the dolus
eventualis. See, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 5, at 70.
93. BROX, supra note 85, at 127. For a similar definition, see also 1 DIETER MEDICUS,
SCHULDRECHT 142 (1988); GALGANO, supra note 63, at 303.
94. "Fault as the criterion of liability has a powerful logical attraction." Tunc, supra
note 73, at 64. Nonetheless, it is not the only criterion:
Towards the end of the nineteenth century it began to be asked whether the social
function of the law of torts was really that of punishing fault and not that of securing
individuals against harms .... This question was precipitated by the rapid increase
of mechanization in industry and in transport, by the political emergence of the
working classes, and by the development of insurance.
AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 203-04. Consequently, new theories for civil liability were
introduced in France. STONE, supra note 1, at 83. However, at least as far as the liability of
one's own act is concerned, fault remains the most important criterion.
95. As for the distinction between intent and negligence, "[i]n general, legal writers do
not attach much importance to this distinction." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 25. This
distinction is, however, relevant in some cases. See, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 5, at 72; 2
JACQUES FLOUR & JEAN-Luc AUBERT, LES OBLIGATIONS 108 (1988); Limpens et al., supra
note 4, at 25. See also CENDON, supra note 74, at 21.
96. BGB § 276(1). While the BGB defines negligence, it does not define intent; in con-
trast, the Civil Code of the former German Democratic Republic (ZGB) defines intent. See
ZGB DDR § 333(2).
97. For a French definition of negligence, i.e., faute non intentionelle, which gives rise to
the so-called quasi-ddlits, see FLOUR & AUBERT, supra note 95, at 108 (proclaiming that fault
in unintentional behavior "consists either in not having foreseen the eventuality of damages or,
if it has been foreseen, in not having adopted the measures necessary to prevent its realiza-
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gence, 98 as do the common law countries, such as England 99 and the
United States. °00 Although no bright line rule exists to determine
what conduct amounts to negligence, 10 1 the cited definition fails even
to provide any guideline for establishing whether negligence exists in
a particular situation. Nevertheless, the aforementioned definition is
helpful to the extent it implies that "[t]he notion of negligent conduct
presupposes a standard of non-negligent or prudent conduct."
10 2
Once this has been determined, it becomes possible to decide whether
there is negligence.
10 3
In some situations, statutes, ordinances or other regulations set
the standard; violation thereof amounts to negligence per se.
I
0
4
In cases where no regulations exist, however, the judge or jury
determines the standard of care. Courts often refer to the standard of
"reasonable man,"' 0 5 the French bon pire de famille,106 or the buon
padre difamiglia. This standard is "independent of the idiosyncracies
tion"). For a discussion of the meaning of negligence in Louisiana law, see STONE, supra note
1, at 372.
98. Some insist that negligence includes a psychological element. See supra note 79.
Others insist that "[n]egligence is the contrary of diligence, and no one describes diligence as a
state of mind." LAWSON & MARKESINIS, supra note 80, at 26 (citation omitted).
99. Certain scholars have proclaimed that:
Negligence usually signifies total or partial inadvertence of the defendant to his con-
duct and/or its consequences. In exceptional cases there may be full advertence to
both the conduct and its consequences. But, in any event, there is no desire for the
consequences, and this is the touchstone for distinguishing negligence from intention.
WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 24.
100. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 29-30.
101. In one case, Judge Reagan proclaimed:
In determining what constitutes negligent conduct there is no fixed rule; the facts and
environmental characteristics of each case must be considered and treated individu-
ally in conformity with the true Civil Law concept. Judicially, we are tending more
and more to an appreciation of the truth that, in the last analysis, there are few rules;
there are principally standards and degrees of negligence for the reason that no one is
so gifted with foresight that he or she could anticipate the variation of facts present in
every accident and prescribe the proper rules for each.
Johnson v. Price, 183 So. 2d 364, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (footnote omitted).
102. STONE, supra note 1, at 87.
103. Fixing a standard is necessary, otherwise the liability for negligence would be "co-
extensive with the judgement of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of
the foot of each individual, (therefor) we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in
all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe." Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837) (Lord Tindal).
104. STONE, supra note 1, at 87.
105. This "fictitious person has never existed on land or sea." KEETON ET AL., supra note
62, § 32, at 174. Further, this standard was probably first established as the applicable stan-
dard to ordinary negligence cases by Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
106. STONE, supra note 1, at 87.
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of the particular person whose conduct is in question."' 10 7 This "ex-
cellent but odious character"108 is not, however, a man' °9 who is
"constantly preoccupied with the idea that danger may be lurking in
every direction about him at any time,"1 0 nor does he' l l represent a
merely objective standard. In fact, because juries must take circum-
stances into account when determining liability," l2 some argue that
"the reasonable person standard may, in fact, combine in varying
measure both objective and subjective ingredients,"" 3 and even that
"the standard is too strict and should give way to a more subjective
approach."' 14
D. The Tort of Negligence
Negligence does not only constitute an element of fault. In com-
mon law, "it also has the further meaning of an independent tort, with
the specific name of 'negligence'." ' 1 5 Its history 16 is generally consid-
ered linked to the industrial revolution"I7 in both England" 18 and the
107. Glasgow Corp. v. Muir, [1943] App. Cas. 448, 457 (Eng.) (Lord MacMillan). See
also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 176 (1884).
108. A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (1930), cited in KEE-
TON ET AL., supra note 62, at 174 n.9. For a discussion of the use of the cited expression, see
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the
'Odious Creature,' 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410 (1970).
109. Instead of speaking of the "reasonable man," most recent decisions speak of the "rea-
sonable person." See, e.g., Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981).
110. Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1964).
111. Even though one normally refers to the reasonable "man," some argue that women
are also reasonable, and urge courts to recognize a reasonable woman standard. See, e.g.,
Stuart L. Bass, The "Reasonable Woman" Standard: The Ninth Circuit Decrees Sexes Perceive
Differently, 43 LAB. L.J. 449 (1992); Howard A. Simon, Ellison v. Brady: A "Reasonable Wo-
man" Standard for Sexual Harassment, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 71 (1991). In order to avoid
any gender bias, some argue that the standard for liability should be gender-free. See, e.g.,
Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the "Reasonable
Man," 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 311 (1976-77); KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 32, at 175 n.9. See
generally Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988).
112. For a list of the circumstances that can affect the standard to be applied, see, e.g.,
KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 32, at 175; STONE, supra note 1, at 382-94.
113. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 32, at 175.
114. Randy T. Austin, Better Off with the Reasonable Man Dead or the Reasonable Man
did the Darndest Things, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 479.
115. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 25. For a comparison of negligence as an
element of tortious liability and negligence as an independent tort, see also GLANVILLE WIL-
LIAMS & B.A. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 88 (1976) (stating that "negli-
gence is both a way of committing various torts and a tort on its own").
116. For the history of the tort of negligence, see Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negli-
gence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. REV. 184 (1926).
117. Of course, instances of an action referring to negligence can be found even in earlier
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United States." t9 This explains why in the United States "[t]he ac-
ceptance of the negligence standard... has often been viewed as a
subsidy for the protection of infant industries,"' 120 even though the
United States' leading case of Brown v. Kendall ' 2 ' "involved not in-
dustry, but instead the actions of private persons engaged in separat-
ing two fighting dogs."' 122 Examining the development of the tort of
negligence in England further weakens this theory. Until Brown v.
Kendall, 23 the development of negligence as a tort paralleled that of
the United States. Yet, its leading case, Donoghue v. Stevenson, I24
times. "There is an instance in 1676, where the action was held to lie when the defendant
negligently sent his servant to break in some unruly horses in Lincoln's Inn Fields, among a
large concourse of His Majesty's lieges, whereby the plaintiff was kicked." WILLIAMS & HEP-
PLE, supra note 115, at 89 (footnote omitted). But see C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES
OF THE COMMON LAW 154 (1949) (noting that in "that time the word had been used in a very
general sense to describe a breach of any legal obligation").
118. "It was perhaps in England that the industrial revolution had its first impact on the
law of tort. A first adjustment occurred merely through expansion of liability for negligence."
Tunc, supra note 73, at 42.
119. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 28, at 161.
120. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 84 (5th ed. 1990). For a
similar explanation of the introduction of the tort of negligence, see MORTON J. HoRwrrz,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 99 (1977) ("One of the most strik-
ing aspects of legal change during the antebellum period is the extent to which common law
doctrines were transformed to create immunities from legal liability and thereby to provide
substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development.").
121. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). The authors of HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 61, at 270,
consider this the leading case for establishing the necessity of proving negligence in order to
impose liability for accident injury. Even though Brown v. Kendall is deemed to be the leading
case, it was not "a total revolution: rather it tidied up the law of torts, removing the eccentric
allocation of the burden of proving due care." E.F. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to
? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 204 (1964-65).
122. Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 225, 229 (footnote omitted). Others also challenge the idea that the birth of the tort of
negligence came from the need to protect infant industries. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 121,
at 205 ("Rather than simply promoting 'General Motors,' is it not more accurate to say that
Chief Judge Shaw saw the change in moral terms as well, as a sound policy not only for
business but for every man? Taken at its own face value in its own period, was not the rule
almost inevitable?"); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REV. 359, 365 (1951) discussing the concern lest the uneven application of civil liability for
harm resulting from negligent conduct "become a factor tending to discourage them from
enterprise and investment!
This very consideration began to worry American judges during half of the nineteenth
century. They disliked the imposition of liability without fault and reacted against any mani-
festation of this notion."
123. "In 1850, however, the two systems [in England and the United States] split asunder
after Chief Justice Shaw's leading opinion in Brown v. Kendall." Roberts, supra note 121, at
201 (footnote omitted).
124. [1932] A.C. 562. Even though the case is known as Donoghue v. Stevenson, its full
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"which revolutionized the law of negligence," 25 arose after the indus-
trial revolution. In England at this time, there was no reason to be-
lieve "that the development ... under a system of private enterprise
would be hindered and delayed as long as the element of chance ex-
posed enterprisers to liability for the consequences of pure accident,
without fault of some sort."
1 26
Despite the fact that their leading cases arose in different eras,
both British and United States tort law define the tort of negligence in
substantially the same way, as "the breach of a legal duty to take care
which results in (consequential) damage, undesired by the defendant,
to the plaintiff." 127 The tort of negligence therefore requires: (1) the
existence of the frequently discussed, 28 and sometimes criticized,
1 29
title reads "M'Alister (or Donoghue) (Pauper) v. Stevenson." Heuston, Donoghue v. Stevenson
in Retrospect, 20 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1957).
This decision has been the subject of various articles in recent years. See, e.g., Harold
Evans, A certain lawyer stood up - Donoghue v. Stevenson 50yrs on, 1982 NEW ZEALAND L.J.
159; DONOGHUE V. STEVENSON AND THE MODERN LAW OF NEGLIGENCE - THE PAISLEY
PAPERS (Peter Burns ed., 1991); Florence O'Donoghue, A Half-Century of Neighbourliness:
Donoghue v. Stevenson Reconsidered, LAW & JUST. 4 (1984); J.C. Smith & Peter Burns, Don-
oghue v. Stevenson - The Not So Golden Anniversary, 46 MOD. L. REV. 147 (1983); Joycey
Tooher, Still Silvery on Its Diamond Jubilee? On the Trial of That Elusive Snail, 66 LAW INST.
J. 379 (1992); Alan Rodger, Lord Macmillan's Speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 108 LAW Q.
REv. 236 (1992). See also Alan Rodger, Mrs. Donoghue and Alfenus Varus, 41 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS 1 (1988) (examining certain interesting details concerning the pursuer).
125. Rina Harber, Snails, snails and more snails, 66 LAW INSTITUTE J. 201 (1992) (re-
viewing DONOGHUE V. STEVENSON AND THE MODERN LAW OF NEGLIGENCE - THE PAIS-
LEY PAPERS (PETER BURNS ed., 1991)).
Of course, even before the cited decision, negligence could give rise to liability, but "prior
to 1932, negligent conduct only gave rise to liability in limited, specific circumstances."
Tooher, supra note 124, at 379. The decision's importance lay in "its insistence upon the
expansible nature of the action of negligence." WILLIAMS & HEPPLE, supra note 115, at 90.
126. Gregory, supra note 122, at 365 (referring to concerns facing industry in the United
States regarding the imposition of liability for merely negligent conduct).
127. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 45.
128. "An obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a
particular standard of conduct towards another." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 331 (3d ed. 1964). The duty of care has been discussed in many articles. See,
e.g., R.W.M. Dias, The Duty Problem in Negligence, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 198 (1955); Leon
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); W.L. Mori-
son, A Re-Examination of the Duty of Care, 11 MOD. L. REV. 9 (1948); F.H. Lawson, The
Duty of Care in Negligence: A Comparative Study, 22 TUL. L. REV. 111 (1947-48); Catherine
Brown, Duty of Care, 65 LAW INST. J. 943 (1991); J.F. Keeler, The Proximity of Past and
Future: Australian and British Approaches to Analyzing the Duty of Care, 12 ADELAIDE L.
REV. 93 (1989); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 LAW
Q. REV. 249 (1991).
129. See, e.g., W.W. Buckland, The Duty to Take Care, 51 LAW Q. REV. 637 (1935);
Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1934); Brown, supra
note 128.
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duty of care; (2) the breach of such duty; (3) damages; and (4) a
causal connection between the actor's conduct and the damage.
However, even though civil law also requires some of the afore-
mentioned elements, such as fault in conduct, causation, and dam-
ages, and even though the tort of negligence seems comparable to the
quasi-ddlits 130 of French law, or to the unintentional torts of the other
civil law countries,13 1 the tort of negligence is not the same as the
unintentional tort of the civil law countries, for its scope of applica-
tion is much broader. 1
32
E. Damages
In tort law, unlike in criminal law, no liability arises without
damages. 133 In fact, "if there be no damage, the law of tort has noth-
130. French law distinguishes between dilits, i.e., intentional torts, and quasi-dilits, or
unintentional torts. Limpens et al., supra 4, at 25. These expressions derive from the Roman
distinction between obligations ex delicto and obligations quasi ex delicto "which arose because
one had caused damage to another by conduct and was required to repair it even though such
conduct was not strictly a delict." STONE, supra note 1, at 2-3. For a treatment of the Roman
obligationes quasi ex delicto, see MAC COMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, supra note 3, at 269;
STONE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
A similar distinction can be found in Louisiana law. STONE, supra note 1, at 19.
"[Olffences are those illegal acts which are done wickedly and with the intent to injure, while
quasi-offences are those which cause injury to another, but which proceed only from error,
neglect, or imprudence." Edwards v. Turner, 6 Rob. 382, 384 (1884).
131. Several authors recognize the possible danger of comparing the common law's tort of
negligence with the civil law's unintentional tort. See, e.g., Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 54
("At first sight, we may be tempted to say that the tort of negligence comes extremely close to
the concept offaute as elaborated in the French-based legal systems, and by the Civil Code art.
1382 in particular.").
132. Of course, the civil law concept of unintentional tort and common law concept of tort
of negligence are comparable for those authors who hold that "the tort of negligence lays the
foundation for a principle of general tortious liability." See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 54.
See also FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 21-23 (12th ed. 1923). This theory has
also been sustained in Europe. See Gallo, supra note 34, at 154.
For those scholars, however, who consider the law of torts as consisting of a body of rules
establishing specific injuries, the tort of negligence is not comparable to the unintentional civil
law tort, i.e., there is no general principle of liability. See, e.g., JOHN SALMOND, LAW OF
TORTS 3 (6th ed. 1924).
For discussion of the merits of each view, see generally Glanville L. Williams, The Foun-
dation of Tortious Liability, 7 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 111 (1941); Percy H. Winfield, The Founda-
tions of Liability in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1927); PERCY H. WINFIELD, THE PROVINCE
OF THE LAW OF TORT 32-39 (1931).
133. See Pierre Catala & John Antony Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, 38 TUL.
L. REV. 663, 663 (1963-64); PIERRE LE TOURNEAU, LA RESPONSABILITi CIVILE 31 (2d ed.
1976) (stating that a crime entails criminal liability even when there is no damage). See also
FERRARI, supra note 5, at 13; PAOLO FORCHIELLI, RESPONSABILITA CIVILE 11 (1983).
French Civil Code art. 1382, for example, states expressly that only an act "which causes
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ing to repair and the plaintiff's claim is to be dismissed."' 134 Even
though this general principle exists both in civil law and in common
law, each has a quite different law of damages. In England and the
United States, for example, the law of damages includes the possibility
of awarding punitive or exemplary damages. 35  In civil law coun-
tries,136 where punishment, the basic function of punitive damages,137
no longer 38 constitutes the function of tortious liability, 139 punitive
damages can never be awarded.14
Various legal systems within the same legal family 141 differ re-
garding the form of reparation allowed. German law, for example,
has a relatively simple law relating to damages for all types of recov-
ery.' 42 The law is characterized by "compensation... in principle to
be effected in kind and not by payment of money .... 1 43 In contrast,
damage to another" results in liability. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 207. That is why,
for instance, it was generally agreed that no claim for damages existed where flying over a
property caused no actual damage. Id.
134. STONE, supra note 1, at 22.
135. Punitive damages are seldom assessed in England. See Catala & Weir, supra note
133, at 666 n.9. In the United States, however, "punitive damages are awarded rather freely."
Id.
136. See, e.g., ALBERTO TRABUCCHI, ISTITUZIONI DI DIRI'TTO CIVILE 185-86 (1990)
("[A]ny penal evaluation is extraneous to tortious liability.").
137. The institution of punitive damages "cannot be exclusively reduced to one legal pur-
pose. Several functions blend together to some extent." Hans Stoll, Consequences of Liability:
Remedies, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at
101. In fact, punitive damages afford satisfaction and they are also used to draw off the profits
obtained by the commission of harm.
138. In Roman law, "ideas of punishment and reparation were often mixed." STONE,
supra note 1, at 22.
139. In civil law, the main functions oftortious liability are compensation and reparation.
See FERRARI, supra note 5, at 11; Cesare Salvi, Responsabilitd contrattuale, 39 ENC. DEL DIR.
1187 (1988); TRABUCCHI, supra note 136, at 185-86.
140. In France, however, some legal writers contend that tortious liability can have the
function of a punishment. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 23 n.24.
141. For a brief treatment of the law of damages in France, Italy and Germany, see, e.g.,
FERRARI, supra note 5, at 23-29, 76-78.
142. While German rules relating to damages apply to both contract law and tort law,
French and Italians employ different rules for recovery of damages in contract and tort cases.
See, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 5, at 24.
143. 1 COHN, supra note 46, at 105. The principle at issue - called Prinzip der
Naturalrestitution, is laid down in German Civil Code § 249:
A person who is obliged to make compensation shall restore the situation which
would have existed if the circumstances rendering him liable to make compensation
had not occurred. If compensation is required to be made for injury to a person or
damage to a thing, the creditor may demand, instead of restitution in kind, the sum
of money necessary for such restitution.
See, e.g., Kremer, Vertrauensschaden, Naturalrestitution und Erfrillungsinteresse, JURISTISCHE
ARBEITSBLA'TrER 485 (1978); Dieter Medicus, Naturalrestitution und Geldersatz, 9 Jus 449
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most countries, such as the Scandinavian countries,'" the common
law countries (including South Africa), as well as some civil law coun-
tries,145 require compensation for the damage caused by tortious con-
duct in the form of money payments. 146
Other differences between the various legal systems exist. While
the systems based upon a "restricted" or "unrestricted pluralism"
generally make distinctions between different kinds of iniuria 147 (such
as harm to property, to a person's health, freedom,' 48 and right to an
established and operative business), those systems following the sin-
gle-rule approach make no such distinctions before imposing liability.
This presupposes, however, that the latter systems have other devices
for imposing the necessary limits on liability. In fact, for a harm to be
compensable in these countries, it must not be caused by a specific
iniuria, but it "must normally be existing and certain,"' 149 and a direct
consequence of the defendant's conduct.' 50 The possibility of invok-
ing these formulas results in great judicial discretion 5 and allows
judges to award damages even in cases where never previously
awarded, such as in wrongful death cases of cohabitating partners. 5 2
In contrast, "pluralistic" systems may not merely invoke magic for-
(1969). But see 1 COHN, supra note 46, at 104 (noting that compensation in the form of money
may be demanded for damage to property-related interests and in certain other cases).
144. See Stoll, supra note 137, at 64.
145. See FERRARI, supra note 5, at 126-27.
146. However, even in those countries the possibility of receiving compensation in kind
exists. See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2056 (Italy).
147. In regard to English law, commentators note that
[tihe concept [of damage] is absent from the digests and indices, and it has never been
a central topic ofdiscussion. The common lawyer would never ask himself the question
'What damage is redressible in an action of tort'? - the system concentrates on iniuria,
not damnum - so it is not surprising that it is difijcult to answer.
Catala & Weir, supra note 133, at 665 (italics in original) (footnotes omitted).
148. German law considers the violation of the aforementioned rights as a tort because its
statutes expressly required it. See BGB § 823(1): "A person who, intentionally or negligently,
unlawfully injures the life, the body, the health, the freedom, the property or other right of
another is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom."
In English law, violations of the foregoing rights constitute different specific torts, such as
trespass to chattel, trespass to land, and battery.
149. See AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 207 (referring to the French requirement).
150. Where, however, damages have not yet been suffered, yet "appear to be certain and
direct consequences of an actual situation," the defendant must compensate for the damages
even before actually occurring. FERRARI, supra note 5, at 77. Where "loss is merely problem-
atical," however, no damages will be awarded. AMos & WALTON, supra note 73, at 207.
151. See 2 ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 8, at 311.
152. For decisions relating to such wrongful death cases in countries which utilize the
single-rule approach, see supra notes 27-29, 36-39. See also 2 ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note
8, at 311-12.
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mulas in order to achieve the same result, but must make new law.15 3
F. Causation
In order to give rise to tortious liability, the intentional or negli-
gent conduct must causei54 the damage, i.e., it must be shown "that a
relation of cause and effect exists between the wrongful act and the
damage."' 155 Establishing this relation is necessary to avoid the "infi-
nite liability for all wrongful acts"'156 which would "set society on
edge ... and fill the courts with endless litigation."' 157
Despite numerous efforts to identify a general principle applica-
ble to all causation problems, 158 no generally accepted theory yet
exists. 159
One possible theory' 6° is the so-called "equivalence theory,"'
161
153. In England, no damages for the wrongful death of a cohabiting partner were compen-
sable until the revision in 1982 of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1976.
154. Sometimes, instead of requiring the harm to be caused by the wrongdoer's conduct,
statutes require the harm to result from, arise from, occur through, be brought about by, be the
consequence of, be produced by, or happen by reason of that conduct. A.M. Honor6, Causation
and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 4, at 11-12. Modem courts and writers generally treat these expressions as synony-
mous. Id. at 12.
At times, however, the expressions causing harm and occasioning harm are distinguish-
able. "[TIhe cause is the factor which is certain to produce the consequence sooner or later, in
one way or another, whilst the occasion merely determines the timing, place or manner of the
upshot." Id.
155. AMos & WALTON, supra note 73, at 211 (footnote omitted). See also FERRARI, supra
note 5, at 78; Pierre Gueux, La relation de cause d effet dans les obligations extracontractuelle,
D. CHR. 205 (1964); STONE, supra note 1, at 34.
156. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 41, at 264. See Glanville Williams, Causation in the
Law, 1961 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 64 (stating that the question of causation "enables us to elimi-
nate irrelevant elements").
157. North v. Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012, 1012 (Minn. 1894).
158. For recent discussion of that question in common law, see generally William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 109 (1983); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091
(1985); Michael A. Pope, Statistical Evidence as Proof of Causation, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 135
(1988); David T. Price, Causation - the Lords' Lost Chance?, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 735
(1989); Robert Roth, Causation and the Burden of Proof- An Age Old Dilemma and a New Age
Approach, 14 ADVOC. Q. 70 (1992); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Deter-
mination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587 (1985); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985). Honor6, supra note 154, at 23, (noting that there are
"some writers who have taken the view that there is no need for a theory of causation").
159. "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disa-
greement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the
manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any general agree-
ment as to the best approach." KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 41, at 263.
160. "The fundamental distinction recognized by Continental theorists is between those
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which considers "every conditio sine qua non [as] a cause of the harm
which would not have occurred without it.'' 162 After governing sev-
eral countries' torts, such as those of France163 and Germany, 164 this
theory was abandoned 165 because "the courts . . .have felt that it
would lead to an undue extension of civil liability."' 166
Instead, the civil law courts turned attention to the "adequacy
theory," or "theory of adequate cause."' 167 According to this the-
ory-based on an evaluation ex ante168 and referred to in France as
prognostic rdtrospectif 169-only those events which in the normal
course of things are likely to produce the damage may be deemed its
cause. 170 Most civil law countries, including France171 and Italy, 172
have adopted this theory. However, in Germany, this theory is corn-
theories which recognize that every particular causal statement is implicitly general, in the
sense that its truth is dependent on the truth of some general statement of regularities, and
those theories which do not recognize this." H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN
THE LAW 433 (2d ed. 1985). However, "[b]etween the individualizing and generalizing theo-
ries we must place the Continental variant of the doctrine of the equivalence of conditions, the
'theory of conditions'." Id. at 434.
161. The Austrian writer Glaser first expounded the modern version of this theory:
If one attempts wholly to eliminate in thoughts the alleged author [of the act] from
the sum of the events in question and it then appears that nevertheless the sequence
of intermediate causes remains the same, it is clear that the act and its consequence
cannot be referred to him.., but if it appears that, once the person in question is
eliminated in thought from the scene, the consequences cannot come about, or that
they can come about only in a completely different way, then one is fully justified in
attributing the consequence to him and explaining it as the effect of his activity.
HART & HONORS, supra note 160, at 442-43 (footnotes omitted).
162. Honor6, supra note 154, at 34.
163. See FLOUR & AUBERT, supra note 95, at 155. See also AMos & WALTON, supra note
73, at 211-12.
164. See Honori, supra note 154, at 31.
165. In Germany, this theory "fell out of favour for civil law after the enactment of the
GERMAN Civil Code." HonorE, supra note 154, at 31. See also ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG,
DIE SCHULDHAFrUNG IM SCHADENSERSATZRECHT 88 (1936).
166. HART & HONORt, supra note 160, at 465. For a similar criticism of the conditlo sine
qua non theory, see MALAURIE & AYNt.S, supra note 22, at 47 ("[This theory has been re-
jected because... it attributes an unlimited number of causes to a damage. It tends to hold
every man liable for all the misfortunes inflicting mankind; this is neither true, nor possible...
one must limit the causal connection.").
167. HART & HONORt, supra note 160, at 465. Note that "[t]he choice of term(s] is some-
times significant, since "adequacy" is preferred to "adequate cause" by those who see the
theory as wholly or partly concerned to set non-causal limits to civil responsibility rather than
to elucidate the meaning of causal connection in civil law." Id. This theory is attributed to the
German psychologist von Kries who first advanced it in the 1880s. Id. at 467.
168. Recently, this method has been suggested in Italy. GALGANO, supra note 63, at 301.
169. See FERRARI, supra note 5, at 80; FLOUR & AUBERT, supra note 95, at 155.
170. AMos & WALTON, supra note 73, at 212.
171. Id.; FERRARI, supra note 5, at 80; STONE, supra note 1, at 37.
172. See GALGANO, supra note 63, at 301.
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bined with the "scope of the rule" theory 173 which "asserts that dam-
ages for harm are recoverable only if the harm is within the scope of
the rule violated."' 174 Thus, "[i]t has been held that even a damage
adequately caused may not have to be compensated for, if the legal
rule under which the compensation is payable was not intended to
offer protection against the type of damage in question."'1 75
England, as well as the United States, have adopted the theory of
proximate cause in order to solve the problem of causation. 176 This
theory, however, based upon Lord Chancellor Bacon's maxim in iure
non remota causa sed proxima spectatur,177 is poorly defined and has
therefore even been spoken of as a chameleon. 78 Several attempts
have been made to establish a universal rule which would resolve all
issues of causation. For example, the "nearest cause" rule attributes
damage only to the event which is nearest in time and space. 179 Simi-
larly, according to the "last human wrongdoer" rule, liability would
be placed upon the last human wrongdoer in time.180 Finally, the
173. "[Tlhis theory was developed independently in the 1920s and 1930s by Rabel in Ger-
many and by Green in the USA." Honor6, supra note 154, at 60 (footnotes deleted).
174. Id. (footnote deleted). See I COHN, supra note 46, at 105.
175. 1 COHN, supra note 46, at 105.
176. Sometimes this expression is substituted by the expression "legal cause." See, e.g.,
Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 212 (1924); Clarence Morris, On the
Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 passim (1939); KEETON ET AL., supra note
62, § 42, at 273. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 ("[Tlhe negligence of the
actor [must] be a legal cause of the other's harm.").
177. See FRANCIS BACON, A Collection of some Principal Rules and Maxims of the Com-
mon Laws of England, in THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS 1 (1630): "In iure non
remota causa sed proxima spectatur. It were infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes,
and their impulsion of one another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and
judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree."
178. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471
(1950) ("Having no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be sub-
stituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that element be-
comes difficult.").
179. In regard to the aforementioned interpretation of the quoted maxim, it has been
stated that "whether Bacon really meant anything of the sort is at least doubtful." KEETON
ET AL., supra note 62, § 42, at 276. For an early criticism of the maxim at issue, see J.H.
Beale, Jr., Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 HARV. L. REV. 80, 81 (1895-1896) (stating
that "[i]f the maxim means anything, it is this: that in looking for the cause of a loss, in order
to affix liability for it, one cannot go behind the last cause").
Nevertheless, the "nearest cause" rule plays a role even nowadays. In fact, in Fennessey v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 10 Cal. 2d 538 (1938), the court held that errors in the instructions
as to proximate cause (defined as the nearest cause by the judge) constituted errors in law and
therefore a ground for new trial. In this case, in fact, the "court instructed the jury, 'proximate
... means the closest cause, the nearest cause that you can find, the cause, if we may say it that
way, in closest proximity.'" Id. at 544.
180. This rule, not unlike the "nearest cause" rule, has been criticized and consequently
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"cause and causation" rule renders the defendant not liable if he has
only created a passive condition upon which the active cause oper-
ated.18' Despite all the theories relating to causation, 18 2 "no definite
principle can be laid down by which to determine this question."
18 3
This is why in the United States, for example, the solution of the
problem at issue is said to "depend essentially on whether the policy
of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the conse-
quences which have in fact occurred."'
8 4
III. CAUSE ]tTRANGtRE AND GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION
A. Cause dtrangre
In spite of the existence of the aforementioned conditions, a de-
fendant may not be held liable if he proves either the existence of an
extraneous cause' 85-the French cause etrange're 86-- or some specific
defence. '8 7
Even though these defenses produce the same effects, i.e., the
failure of the plaintiff's action to be held as tortious conduct, 88 they
must be distinguished. While the existence of an extraneous cause
interrupts the chain of causation, 8 9 defense on grounds of justifica-
abandoned because "it has the effect of cutting off plaintiff's remedies against negligent actors
who should be responsible." JAMES B. MALONE, THEORIES OF CAUSATION IN THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 353, 354.
181. Although this theory has been rejected, nevertheless one can still find the mentioned
expressions in the decisions because "it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations." KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 42, at 277-78.
182. For an overview of further theories and their criticism, including the "natural and
probable consequences" rule, the "substantial factor" rule, the "justly attachable cause" rule,
and the "but for" rule, see MALONE, supra note 180, at 353, 354-57.
183. 1 THOMAS A. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906). See
also Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 50 (1991); KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 42, at 279 (refer-
ring to the "fruitless quest for a universal formula"). See also Richard W. Wright, Causation
in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1737, 1737 (1985) (stating that "the causation requirement has
resisted all efforts to reduce it to a useful, comprehensive formula...").
184. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 42, at 273. For a comparison of this view with
other authors' views, see generally Kelley, supra note 183.
185. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 214. "The defendant may negative the existence
of a causal relationship between his action and the damage by proving that the damage was
occasioned by an extraneous event for which he was not responsible." Id.
186. The expression cause dtrangire is borrowed from article 1147 of the French Civil
Code. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 214.
187. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 614.
188. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 81 (proclaiming that "it is true that these two
types of defence very often produce the same result, i.e., the dismissal of the tortious claim").
189. Honori, supra note 154, at 91. "'Extraneous cause' is a synonym for a cause which is
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tion acknowledges this relationship, but relieves the conduct of its
blameworthy character. 190
The extraneous cause concept encompasses different causes
6trangdres, such as superior force (force majeure), chance (cas for-
tuit), 191 action of the third party, and fault of the victim. 192 However,
in order to break the chain of causation, the extraneous cause must, at
least in France, present certain characteristics: "the event must be un-
foreseeable and irresistible (or inevitable)."1 9 3 As far as the "foresee-
ability" and the "unavoidability" (or "irresistibility") are
concerned, 194 some argue that nothing is really unforeseeable and un-
avoidable. Thus, the courts have stated that an event is considered an
extraneous cause if it is "normally"1 95 unavoidable and unforesee-
able, 196 i.e., if a reasonable man could not have avoided or foreseen
it. 197
An interesting problem concerning the extraneous cause con-
counted as the sole cause of the harm, interrupts the chain of causation, prevents the existence
of an adequate relationship between the tortfeasor's conduct and the harm or otherwise ren-
ders the damage too remote ...... Id. See also AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 214;
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 81.
190. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 81. Where there is justification,
the defendant has not been sued wrongly or by mistake, [unlike in the case of cause
6trangire]; it was he who caused the damage, and his behaviour suggests he is at
fault. But really, when we take a closer look, we see that the fault is only apparent,
and that the certain factors excuse or justify his behaviour.
Id.
191. French courts use the expressions casfortuit and force majeure synonymously. AMOS
& WALTON, supra note 73, at 214. See also FERRARI, supra note 5, at 107; STARCK, supra
note 25, at 278.
In the rare instances where possible distinctions have been suggested we find the
following attempts. Casfortuit is a natural happening which occasions damage such
as a flood or earthquake, whileforce majeure refers to a non-natural happening, pro-
ceeding from the will of the person other than the one sued....
STONE, supra note 1, at 59.
192. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 214.
193. Pierre Catala & Anthony Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, 39 TUL. L.
REV. 701, 759 (1964-1965). See also FERRARI, supra note 5, at 107; STONE, supra note 1, at
59.
194. These conditions were also required in Roman law in order to lead to the dismissal of
the tortious claim. See STONE, supra note 1, at 59. "Ulpian defined vis major as all force to
which resistance was not possible . . . thus stressing its irresistibility, and casus fortuitus as
events which human deliberation... is able to foresee thus stressing its unforseeability .... Id.
195. The introduction of this adverb into court decisions derived from the work of the
Mazeaud brothers and "succeeded in introducing a little flexibility into an area disfigured by
the abuses of logical abstractions." Catala & Weir, supra note 193, at 761 n. 181.
196. FERRARI, supra note 5, at 107.
197. The reference to the "reasonable man" has lead to the statement that "the unforesee-
ability and the unavoidability are evaluated in abstracto." STARCK, supra note 25, at 282.
838 Loy. L.A. Int' & Comp. L.J [Vol. 15:813
cerns the value of the victim's fault,198 the faute de la victime,199
which finds its origin in Roman law. In Roman law, an injured party
whose own fault led to his harm could only recover if the tortfeasor's
fault was intentional.200
In France, the victim's fault, if it concurred with the plaintiff's
fault, usually led to the reduction of damages,201 at least until a deci-
sion on July 21, 1982.202 After this decision, 20 3 the plaintiff's fault
would entail the apportionment of damages only if the faute de la
victime was unforeseeable and unavoidable. 2° 4 This rule, however,
has been mitigated in 1987 when the Cour de Cassation20 5 established
that there will be reduction of the damages "if the defendant proves
that the victim's fault has contributed to the harmful event," 20 6 even if
the fault was not unforeseeable or unavoidable.
In the United States, there is no uniform solution to contributory
198. In civil law countries, the expression usually referred to is "the victim's fault" or "the
fault of the injured party." See, e.g., HonorS, supra note 154, at 94. This expression has been
criticized; some argue that it would be more proper to speak of the victim's act. Catala &
Weir, supra note 193, at 762. "This is perfectly logical .... A fault often plays a causal role,
but an act or circumstance in which there is no element of fault can perfectly well be causal
.... .Id. This is the case, for example, when a child too young to be morally responsible or a
lunatic person suffers harm as a result of his own act. In such cases, "when the incapable
person is himself plaintiff his material contribution to the accident is taken into account and
the defendant will be exonerated to the extent that the plaintiff's actions caused the damage."
AMos & WALTON, supra note 73, at 216 (footnote omitted).
199. In France, this problem is identified by the expression faute de la victime; in Ger-
many, it is called eigenes Verschulden des Geschddigten. Honor6, supra note 154, at 94. In
English, no "expression of art" corresponds to the aforementioned phrases, although a similar
concept can also be found in common law. Even in common law there is no uniform solution.
Indeed, in order to solve the problem at issue, two concepts are applied: "contributory negli-
gence" and "comparative negligence." However, none of these expressions corresponds di-
rectly to the French one. Some conclude that contributory negligence has a more restricted
meaning than the French expression, since "(it] excludes that conduct of the injured party
which is not merely contributory to the harm but its sole cause .... or which is intentional
rather than merely negligent, or which occurs after the tortfeasor's conduct has affected the
injured part." Id. (footnote omitted).
200. Id. "[I]f anyone suffers damage through his own fault he is not regarded as suffering
damage." Id.
201. See STONE, supra note 1, at 69.
202. See Civ., July 21, 1982, GAZ. PAL. II 391 (1982).
203. The rule that the plaintiff's fault lead to the reduction of the compensable damages to
be compensated was first applied in the 1930s. See, e.g., Civ., Dec. 13, 1936, GAZ. PAL. 1 157
(1937).
204. See FERRARI, supra note 5, at 108.
205. See Civ., April 6, 1987, BULL. civ. II 86 (1987).
206. Judgment of April 6, 1987, supra note 205, cited in FERRARI, supra note 5, at 109.
This rule also applies to the fault of the third party. See, e.g., STARCK, supra note 25, at 284.
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fault. In fact, some jurisdictions20 7 have adopted the contributory
negligence208 rule, based on English law.2° Under contributory negli-
gence, the plaintiff's fault completely bars any recovery against the
defendant. Most jurisdictions, however, avoid this harsh result by ap-
plication of the comparative negligence rule. There are three distinct
versions of this rule.210 First, under "pure" comparative negligence,
the plaintiff's damages are reduced in proportion to his fault.211 Sec-
ond, under the "fifty percent" rule, recovery is barred completely only
if the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's. 21 2 Finally,
under the "forty-nine" percent rule, the action is dismissed if the
207. "As of October, 1989, only six United States jurisdictions continue to apply the com-
mon-law rule that contributory negligence completely bars an injured person's recovery...
these are Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia." Joseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Propor-
tional Liability, 41 ALA. L. REV. 13 (1989). However, "South Carolina... adopted compara-
tive fault in a recent judicial opinion." William F. Horsley, The Argument for Comparative
Fault, 38 N. C. B. Q. 18, 19 (1991).
208. For a critical approach to contributory negligence, see, e.g., Leon Green, Illinois Neg-
ligence Law II, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 116 (1944); Frank E. Maloney, From Contributory to
Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135 (1958). For a more
recent attack on contributory negligence, see Horsley, supra note 207; Wex S. Malone, Some
Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 65 UTAH L. REV. 91 (1981).
209. The idea of contributory negligence "first appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, though the general idea is traceable much earlier." WINFIELD & JOLOWlCZ, supra
note 89, at 106. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809), appears to be the earliest
English case; as for this affirmation, see, e.g., Horsley, supra note 207, at 19; KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 62, § 65, at 451 n. 1; WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 106.
In England, the problem of extraneous causation was solved in 1945 by the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act. Section 1(1) states that:
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of
the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not
be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the dam-
ages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks
just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the
damage.
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, Ch. 28, § 1(1) (Eng.).
210. For a recent, complete survey on the different versions of comparative negligence, as
well as for the jurisdictions which adopt them, see Little, supra note 207, at 27-33. However,
there are more variations on the rules relating to comparative negligence than the three men-
tioned. "Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee employ a so-called "slight-gross" rule...
the basic requirement is that the plaintiff's negligence must be slight and the defendant's gross
to avoid barring the action." Id. at 29.
211. In 1989, thirteen states employed pure comparative negligence. While seven states
operate under judicially made rules (Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Mis-
souri, and New Mexico), six operate under statutes (Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
York, Rhode Island, and Washington).
212. In 1989, twenty states employed the "fifty percent" rule; for a list of these states, see
Little, supra note 207, at 29.
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plaintiff's fault is equal to or greater than the defendant's. 213
B. Self-Defense and Necessity
The liability of the defendant may also be affected by the defense
of justification,214 or "factors justifying the defendant's action." 215
Onefaitjustificatif216 is self-defense. Today, self-defense is "a ground
of justification in every legal system. ' 21 7 It "negatives any liability in
tort, ' 218 even in those countries where tortious liability is not based
upon the concept of fault.219 Self-defense is defined 220 as conduct that
causes damage, but does not constitute a tort because it is done in
order to repel an aggression. 221 In all legal systems, this conduct must
satisfy several conditions2 22 in order to negate liability. Generally, to
213. In 1989, nine states employed the "forty-nine percent" rule: Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.
214. The grounds of justification have sometimes been defined as "negative elements" or
"negative characteristics" of fault; see, e.g., AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 220; FER-
RARI, supra note 5, at 83. However, it has even been said that "there is no justification for a
tort. The so-called justification is an exceptional fact which shows that no tort was commit-
ted." Joseph H. Beale, Justification for Injury, 41 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1928).
215. AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 220.
216. As to a recent treatment of the grounds of justification in France, see DINGOME, LE
FAIT JUSTIFICATIF EN MATItiRE DE RESPONSABILITt CIVILE (1986).
217. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 81. In civil law, self-defense (defined sometimes as
"necessary defense;" see, e.g., Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 81) always existed as a justifica-
tion (even in SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, one can find some references to self-defense),
but "early English law, with its view of strict liability, did not recognize such a privilege."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 19, at 124. It was not until the year 1400 that the common
law recognized self defense as a justification for a crime. Y.B. 2 Hen. 4, pl. 40 (1400). In fact,
it has been stated that "in 1294 and in 1319 the defendant was obliged to respond; but in 1400
and ever since, the plea is accepted as a complete defence." John H. Wigmore, Responsibility
for Tortious Acts: Its History III, 7 HARV. L. REv. 446 (1894).
218. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 631.
219. It has been stated that "in classical Mohammedan law, for example, in principle an
act is of itself sufficient to impose liability, and the state of mind of the person concerned is
irrelevant. This might suggest that no grounds of justification would be recognized. Neverthe-
less, classical Mohammedan law accepts necessary defense as a ground of justification."
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 82.
220. In several legal systems, the legislature expressly provides a definition. See, e.g., BGB
§ 227; CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 284 (Greece); C.c. art. 2044 (Italy); MINPO art. 720(1) (Ja-
pan); CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 52(1) (Switz.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 149 (Taiwan).
Other legal systems have no express definition offered by the civil codes. The judges and
legal scholars have developed this justification based on general principles of tortious liability
and on criminal law principles. In France, for example, while the Code Civil does not provide
any definition of self-defense, Penal Code art. 328 does.
221. For a similar definition, see STONE, supra note 1, at 191.
222. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 82-83, lists six conditions: (1) an attack which must be
(2) immediate or imminent and (3) unlawful and an (4) intentional, (5) proportional conduct
(6) directed towards the author of the attack. Id. Some summarize these conditions and list
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constitute self-defense, the action must be taken to avoid unlawful 223
and actual224 aggression. Consequently, when the defensive action
occurs after the threat of aggression has subsided, 225 or "where there
is no right to defend oneself against an opponent who is authorized
... or who, as a servant of the state, is acting within his authority,
226
the attacked person becomes the aggressor and is subject to liability
for his conduct. Furthermore, in order to constitute self-defense, the
conduct must be proportional227 to the aggression; it must not exceed
the limits of necessity. 22 Where the attacked person's conduct "goes
beyond the real or apparent necessities of his or her defense,
'229
"there would be abuse of self-defense" 230 generally resulting in tor-
tious liability. 23
1
If the act of self-defense harms not the original aggressor, but a
third party, the claim of self-defense is vitiated.232 In such a case, the
only two conditions: an unlawful attack and a proportional conduct. MALAURIE & AYNts,
supra note 22, at 57.
223. Unlawful aggression is expressly required in German Civil Code § 227: "An act done
in defense is not unlawful. Defense is any defensive action necessary in order to repel an
immediate and unlawful attack upon oneself or another." Id.
224. As for actual aggression, see German Civil Code § 227, supra note 223. In German
law, an aggression is actual up until the moment where the danger has ceased. See, e.g., FER-
RARI, supra note 5, at 82 n.115.
225. "It is clear that once the defendant has repelled the aggression, any additional force
applied is in the nature of vengeance and constitutes an aggression itself." STONE, supra note
1, at 194. For a similar statement, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 19, at 127, where the
authors proclaim that "revenge is not a defense." For court decisions, see Germolus v.
Sausser, 85 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1901); Monize v. Begaso, 76 N.E. 460 (Mass. 1906); Tezeno v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 166 So. 2d 351 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
226. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 83.
227. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 169 (Libya); CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 149
(Taiwan).
228. "No compensation need be paid for harm caused by necessary defense unless the
limits of necessity are exceeded." GRAZHDANSKIi KODEKS RSFSR [GK RSFSR] art. 448
(1964) (Russia), quoted in Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 82.
229. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 19, at 126. The problem of unproportional, or
unreasonable or excessive force has been treated also in Roman law. Ulpian stated:
Where, however, anyone kills another who is attacking him with a weapon, he is not
held to have killed him unlawfully; and where anyone kills a thief through fear of
death, there is no doubt that he is not liable under the Lex Aquilia. But if he is able
to seize him, and prefers to kill him, the better opinion is that he commits an unlaw-
ful act, and therefore he will be liable under the Lex Cornelia.
STONE, supra note 1, at 193, quoted in DIG. 9.2.5.pr. (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18).
230. MALAURIE & AYNtS, supra note 22, at 57.
231. However, there are legal systems, such as those in Taiwan and Libya, whose "statu-
tory provisions lay down that a person guilty of excessive defense must merely pay an equitable
indemnity." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 83.
232. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 194-95; WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at
633.
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person is said to be acting under necessity, 233 dtat de ne'cessiti, Not-
stand, stato di necessitd.234 Necessity requires conditions similar to
those of self-defense in order to negate liability, i.e., "an actual or
threatened illegal wrong" 235 and no available alternative to avoid the
harm. However, the defense of necessity, rarely used in common
law, 236 has additional requirements; the occasion of the necessity may
not arise from the defendant's own negligence.237 Furthermore, in
some countries, such as Italy, the actual or threatened wrong must be
grave;238 in other countries, such as France, the interest sacrificed
must be less than the one saved. 239 As far as the consequences of
conduct under necessity are concerned, while some legal systems
(France, Germany, Poland, and common law countries, as far as in-
tentional torts are concerned) 240 consider necessity as being a justifica-
tion negating all liability,241 other systems (mainly Mohammedan
systems) 242 do not relieve a person from liability. A third group of
233. It has been said that the only difference between necessity and self-defense is that "in
necessity the damage is done to a third party, and not to the author of an unlawful and imme-
diate attack." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 83.
234. As for a treatment of necessity in French law, see, e.g., PAUL PALLARD,
L'EXCEPTION DE NIECESSITt EN DROIT CIVIL (1949); RENt SAVATIER, L'tTAT DE NtCESSITf
ET LA RESPONSABILITt CIVILE EXTRA-CONTRACTUELLE, in f-TUDES CAPITANT 729 (1956).
As for German law, see Ortrun Lampe, Defensiver und aggresiver tibergesetzlicher Notstand, 21
NJW 88 (1968); Wilhelm Weimar, Die zivilrechtliche Haftung bei strafrechtlichem Notstand,
15 NJW 2093 (1962). In Italy, too, this problem has been addressed by several scholarly
works. See MAURO BRIGUGLIO, LO STATO DI NECESSITA NEL DIRITrO CIVILE (1963); Bruno
Inzitari, Necessitd, in 27 ENC. DEL DIR. 852 (1979).
235. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 635.
236. Winfield and Jolowicz state that "the authority on it is scanty." Id.
237. This condition is expressly required: "[w]here a person causes damage through the
necessity of protecting himself or another from immediate harm and grave personal danger,
and the danger was not caused voluntarily by that person and could be avoided in no other way
.... .C.C. art. 2045 (Italy).
238. See id.
239. As a result, in France, one cannot consider the sacrifice of a human life instead of
one's own life a necessity. See AMOS & WALTON, supra note 73, at 223. "French law would
not admit that one was entitled to sacrifice another's life for one's own safety." Id. See also
FERRARI, supra note 5, at 83; MALAURIE & AYNtS, supra note 22, at 53. In Italy, however, it
is possible to consider the sacrifice of another person's life to save one's own life a necessity.
See, e.g., GALGANO, supra note 63, at 300.
240. For a more complete list of countries, see Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 84-87.
241. However, in these systems both case law and legal theory tend to favor some indem-
nity for the victim. In Germany, for example, while the necessity governed by Germany Civil
Code § 228 (Notstandsverteidigung) relieves the defendant of all liability, unless the defendant
"caused the danger through his own fault," Germany Civil Code § 904 (Notstandsangriff) pro-
vides that the victim has the right to claim damages. For a more complete treatment of neces-
sity in Germany, see, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 5, at 122.
242. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 86.
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systems (including Italy,243 Libya,244 Switzerland, Turkey,245 Aus-
tria, 246 and Greece247) utilize an intermediate approach under which
the person claiming necessity is bound to pay an indemnity to be de-
termined by the judge on the basis of equitable principles.
C. Consent, Assumption of Risk, and Other Grounds of
Justification
In several common law systems248 and civil law systems, not un-
like in Roman law (volenti non fit iniuria),249 consent negates the
existence of liability. Under common law, consent negates liability by
not recognizing a tort where the absence of consent is a definitional
part of a specific tort, such as assault.250 In civil law, consent negates
the unlawfulness of the conduct. 25' Of course, in order for the con-
sent to be valid, several conditions must be met. The consent must be
manifest, though it need not be express. 252 It may be implied from
circumstances 253 or, in an exceptional case, through necessity. 254 For
243. Where a person causes damage through the necessity of protecting himself or
another from immediate and grave personal danger, and the danger was not caused
voluntarily by that person and could be avoided in no other way, the victim has a
right to an indemnity, the extent of which is left to the judge's equitable discretion.
C.c. art. 2045 (Italy).
244. See C. Civ. art. 171 (Libya).
245. "The judge shall equitably determine the sum payable in compensation by a person
who injures the property of another in order to protect himself or a third party from damage
or imminent danger." CODE OBLIGATIONS [C. OBLIG.] art. 52(2) (Switz.).
246. See ABGB § 1306a (Austria).
247. See C. Civ. art. 286(1) (Greece).
248. The principle of consent as justification can be found in English law in Bracton's De
Legibus Angliae (1250-1258). This principle (worded as it is now, volenti non fit iniuria) first
appeared in a case of 1305, 33-5 Edw. I (Rolls 90b Series). WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra
note 89, at 614.
249. It has been said that the idea "underlying [consent] has been traced as far back as
Aristotle, and it was also recognized in the works of the classical Roman jurists." Id.
250. Holmes states that "the absence of lawful consent is part of the definition of assault."
Ford. v. Ford, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1887). The same is true of conversion (Tousley v.
Board of Educ., 40 N.W. 509 (Minn. 1888)), false imprisonment (Ellis v. Cleveland, 54 Vt. 437
(1882)), and trespass (Bennett v. McIntire, 23 N.E. 78 (Ind. 1889)). For further cases, see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 18, at 112 nn.5-8.
251. "[T]he consent of the victim is considered to be a justification, in view of which an act
is not unlawful." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 89. "mhe consent of the victim causes in
principle the illicit character of the conduct to disappear." CARBONNIER, supra note 64, at 95.
252. For an example of express consent, see STONE, supra note 1, at 181.
253. A classic example of implied consent is participation in a football game. "[Flootball
players are considered to give implied consent to any future injuries suffered in the normal
course of the game." Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 89. Another example to which legal
writers often refer relates to the situation wherein a person lines up with others and holds out
his arm for a vaccination. O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
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example, consent is implied for surgery where a patient is unable to
consent due to lack of consciousness, provided that the operation
would prevent serious harm and a reasonable person would give con-
sent.255 Even if consent is given, however, the defendant may still be
held liable under certain circumstances. In Italy, for example, con-
sent negates liability only if it is given by the person having authority
to do so 2 5 6 and if it relates to alienable rights. 257 In other countries,
not only must the consent be freely given, 25 8 but it also cannot be
procured by fraud. 259
Under common law, the principle volenti non fit iniuria does not
only appear as a defense under the heading of consent, but also under
assumption of risk.260 Assumption of risk261 constitutes a much criti-
254. Some authors refer to this situation as the emergency rule rather than as implied
consent. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 120, at 19. Others prefer to speak of the emergency
"privilege." They argue that it is not consent which negates the doctors' liability, "but such
lawful action [the doctors' conduct] is more satisfactorily explained as a privilege." KEETON
ET AL., supra note 62, § 18, at 117.
255. For some cases, see, e.g., McGuire v. Rix, 225 N.W. 120 (Neb. 1929); Jackovach v.
Yocom, 237 N.W. 444 (Iowa 1931); Preston v. Hubbell, 196 P.2d. 113 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1948).
256. See TRIMARCHI, supra note 73, at 140. in the United States it has also been pointed
out that consent must be given by the person having the authority to do so. Generally, in the
case of a minor, the consent must be given by his parents or legal custodian. In some cases,
however, jurisdictions such as Illinois and New Jersey "have taken the child from the parents
[or person having the legal custody] and made it temporarily the ward of the court or state for
the purpose of giving the requisite consent." STONE, supra note 1, at 184. See, e.g., People v.
Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962).
257. See CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 50 (1932)(Italy). See also FERRARI, supra note 5, at
85.
258. A man cannot said to be truly 'willing' unless he is in a position to choose freely,
and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on
which the exercise of choice is conditional, so that he may be able to choose wisely,
but the absence of any feeling of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the
freedom of his will.
WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 89, at 618 (citing Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corp., K.B.
476, 479 (1944)).
259. Cases relating to consent procured by fraud generally deal with sexual or intimate
bodily contact. See, e.g., Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868); Bartell v. State, 82 N.W. 142
(Wis. 1900); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920); People v. Steinberg, 73 N.Y.S.2d
475; Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co., 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1957).
260. See Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 89. For a history of this defense, see Charles
Warren, Volenti Non fit Iniuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1895).
261. Those critical of assumption of risk as a defense have stated that it should be abol-
ished. "Except for express assumption of risk.., the term and the concept should be abol-
ished." Fleming James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141, 169 (1952). For a more recent
criticism, see 4 F. HARPER ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 21.8, at 259 (2d ed. 1986). "[The] con-
cept of assuming the risk is purely duplicative of other more widely understood concepts, such
as scope of duty or contributory negligence." Id. But see Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of
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cized affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the defendant.262
Assumption of risk follows the same rationale as consent 263 and has
the same results, i.e., it bars the plaintiff's recovery (provided that it
can be defined as "primary" assumption of risk).2M In civil law, as-
sumption of risk is also a recognized defense.265 However, it is does
not always have the same consequences. In France, for example, the
acceptation des risques does not negate the defendant's fault, but
merely results in a reduced liability.
266
Apart from the aforementioned justifications, the various legal
systems recognize other grounds of justification. Where, for example,
an individual causes damage by complying with a superior's orders,
both civil law267 and common law268 provide for a privilege that bars
the plaintiff's recovery, provided the order was lawful.
269
The defendant can also negate liability by proving to have acted
under lawful authority. 270 For example,27 1 if a policeman arrests an
individual in the course of his duty and with proper warrant, there is
Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1987).
Despite the criticism, the doctrine of assumption of risk has not lost its appeal; it has been
recently treated in several scholarly works. See, e.g., Ann K. Bradley, Reasonable Implied
Assumption of Risk as a Complete Defense in Sports Injury, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 393 (1988);
John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk after Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract The-
ory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (1991); Jeffrey J. Gearhart, Assumption of Risk
Rides Again, 41 ARK. L. REV. 657 (1988); James C. Glassford, Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club:
Assumption of Risk on Trial: To the Dismay of the Plaintiff's Bar, This one Discredited Defense
Being Revived, 11 CAL. LAW. 57 (1991).
262. McInnis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 155 (La. 1975).
263. For the rationale of assumption of risk, see Settoon v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 48 La.
Ann. 807 (1896).
264. For the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk, see EPSTEIN,
supra note 120, at 318.
265. See FERRARI, supra note 5, at 85.
266. See, e.g., STARCK, supra note 25, at 158.
267. This defense is known in French and in Italian law. See, e.g., FERRARI, supra note 5,
at 84; MALAURIE & AYNtS, supra note 22, at 53; STARCK, supra note 25, at 156.
268. See, e.g., HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 61, at 119.
269. AMos & WALTON, supra note 73, at 223. In French law, "the plea of superior orders
raises problems of principle analogous to those of the plea of necessity. A subordinate is not
bound to execute passively orders which he knows, or ought to know, to be wrongful." Id.
French legal writers have pointed out that the order is lawful when (1) it is issued by a source
who is legally empowered to do so, see Judgement of March 31, 1933, G.P. I 973 (1933), and
(2) when the order does not contrast with any provision, see Judgement of March 18, 1955, D.
573 (1955).
For the requirement of similar conditions in Italian law, see ANTOLISEI, DIRITrO
PENALE 238 (1983); FERRARI, supra note 5, at 84 n.124. Similar conditions must also be met
under German law. See, e.g., BGH, May 25, 1955, BGHZ 17, 327.
270. It has been said this defense is "most frequently invoked in the realm of public law, -
as where a civil servant, acting in his official capacity and within the limits of his authority,
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no liability 272 unless the policeman abused his authority. 273
However, in common law, as well as in some civil law countries,
the right of "arrest without warrant" authorizes police to make ar-
rests without first obtaining a warrant. The rationale is to prevent
crimes and to protect the arresting officer from liability.
There are, of course, other grounds of justification which vary
from country to country. However, in spite of this diversity, one can
conclude that they all seem to have one common denominator: "they
are invariably based upon pressure being brought to bear on the
tortfeasor which restricts his freedom of action or counteracts his
scale of value. '274
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to outline the laws of torts as it
varies with each country's legal system in order to illustrate that the
actual differences between the systems are not too relevant. Indeed,
generally, "where a plaintiff would recover in France, he would re-
cover, too, in England. ' ' 275 Apart from some unique rules, for exam-
ple punitive damages in common law, compensation for wrongful
death of a cohabitating partner in some French based systems, and
compensation in kind in some German based systems, the tort law of
the various countries tends to produce the same consequences. This
affirmation presupposes common aims and common conditions.
However, since the conditions for tortious liability are basically the
same, there is no doubt that the different law of torts will continue to
achieve the very same results.
interferes with a person's property . . . or where he infringes someone's personal rights."
Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 88.
271. Other cases relate to the parents' power to physically discipline their children or to
judicial orders. However, there are tendencies to "abolish" this absolute power. In Germany,
for example, the parents' power to discipline their children has been severely criticized. See,
e.g., Horst Petri, Abschaffung des elterlichen Z'chtigungsrechts, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTS-
POLITIK 64 (1974). In Italy in 1988, a law on judges' liability was enacted under which judicial
officials can currently be held liable for causing damages either intentionally or cum culpa lata.
272. For an application of this principle, see, e.g., Logan v. Swift, 327 So. 2d 168 (La. Ct.
App. 1976).
273. For example, where an officer strikes a prisoner without cause. Eg., Dufrene v. Ro-
drigue, 38 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1949). See also Polizzi v. Trist, 154 So. 2d 84 (La. Ct.
App. 1963).
274. Limpens et al., supra note 4, at 92.
275. Catala & Weir, supra note 193, at 780.
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